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INTRODUCTION 
This year, 2016, marks the thirtieth anniversary of Proposition 65 (“Prop 
65”), a voter initiative that passed in California under the more imposing name of 
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986.1 Although Prop 65 is 
touted for its simplicity and fundamental “right to know” underpinnings, it 
continues to raise the ire of businesses both large and small, many of which are 
subject to Prop 65’s warning requirements.2 California is awash in Prop 65 
warnings, whether on consumer products or in hotels, restaurants, ballparks, 
parking garages, office buildings, amusement parks, and pools.3 Governor Brown’s 
ambitious legislative efforts to strengthen and restore the original intent of Prop 654 
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 1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25259.13 (West 2006). 
 2. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Margulies, Court Ruling Reveals Absurdity of California’s Proposition 65, 19 ANDREWS 
TOXIC CHEMICALS LITIG. REP., no. 24, Mar. 8, 2002, at 12 (noting the “high cost of performing Prop 65 exposure 
assessments” to prove chemical exposure  levels are safe). In fact, because such assessments pose a huge burden, 
a business that may be in compliance with Prop 65 will “[s]ettle with the plaintiff, of course. Save the cost of the 
assessment. Save the legal fees. Get rid of the case.” Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 
646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (Vogel, J., dissenting)). 
 3. Michael L. Marlow, Too Much (Questionable) Information?, REGULATION, Winter 2013–2014, at 22 
(describing the plethora of warnings conveyed “by a typical California hotel.”), 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2014/1/regulation-v36n4-6.pdf. 
 4. See Marc Lifsher, Brown Seeks to Rewrite Toxics Law, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/business/la-fi-prop65-overhaul-20130508 (“Proposition 65 is a good 
law that’s helped many people, but it’s being abused by unscrupulous lawyers.”). Political reality converted 
Governor Brown’s 2013 ambitious legislative proposals into modest enforcement relief for small businesses, 
codified in Section 25249.7(k).   
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yielded only limited improvements,5 leaving California’s Office of Environmental 
Health Hazard Assessment (“OEHHA”) and Office of the Attorney General to 
propose ostensible improvements through the regulatory process.6 OEHHA’s 
particular efforts, however, highlight inherent flaws with Prop 65 itself––flaws 
beyond the ability of OEHHA to cure through regulation.7 
The first part of this article discusses the impetus for Prop 65 and provides an 
overview of its crucial, and controversial, features.8 The second part highlights the 
fundamental flaws of Prop 65––focusing on consumer product warnings and 
bounty hunter provisions––that stubbornly persist notwithstanding recent 
legislative and regulatory efforts to address them.9 This article concludes by 
discussing alternative approaches to Prop 65.10 
I. THE IMPETUS FOR PROPOSITION 65 
Proposition 6511 was one of over a half-dozen initiatives on the ballot12 in the 
November 4, 1986 California general election, and garnered a nearly two-to-one 
 
 5. See Melanie Mason, Brown Signs Law Amending State’s Anti-Toxins Law, Proposition 65, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 5, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ln-brown-california-amend-antitoxins-
law-20131005-story.html; Jack Schatz, Proposition 65 Reform Legislation Abandoned by Gov. Brown, 
PROP65NEWS.COM (Sept. 9, 2013), http://prop65news.com/Story-Details/ArticleID/7533/Prop-65-Reform-
Legislation-Abandoned-by-Gov-Brown. 
 6. See Natalie E. Rainer et al., California Prop 65 Enforcement Amendment Summary re: Office of 
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-prop-65-enforcement-amendment-summary-re-office-
environmental-health (“The California Attorney General’s Office recently proposed regulations intended to 
reform the private enforcement of Proposition 65. . . . Ultimately the Attorney General’s proposed regulations 
will likely increase the costs to defendants in Proposition 65 actions.”). 
 7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12(a) (West 2006) (explicitly confining OEHHA’s 
regulatory reach to “conform with” Prop 65 and “to further its purposes”). 
 8. See infra Part I. This article does not address or propose to modify Section 25249.5 and related sections 
of Prop 65 that prohibit toxic discharges into drinking water. The formal title of Prop 65, coupled with Section 
25249.5, which precedes the warning provisions, underscore Prop 65’s foremost intent to keep businesses from 
discharging toxic chemicals into drinking water. Section 25249.5 states in full that “[n]o person in the course of 
doing business shall knowingly discharge or release a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or 
reproductive toxicity into water or onto or into land where such chemical passes or probably will pass into any 
source of drinking water . . . .” § 25249.5. This Section garnered the attention of the press. The Los Angeles 
Times, for example, focused on the drinking water aspect of the provision in recommending that constituents 
vote against the initiative. See No on Toxics Initiative, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1986), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-29/local/me-7725_1_drinking-water. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. Drafted by (former) Environmental Defense Fund attorney David Roe, Sierra Club political director 
Carl Pope, and Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Tom Houston, Prop 65 was intended to address voter’s “growing 
concerns about exposure to toxic chemicals;” a self-styled “populist cure for government’s chronic failures to 
control toxic chemicals.” See Paul Jacobs, California Elections: Prop. 65: Toxics Calamity or Legal Catalyst?, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-13/news/mn-3020_1_hazardous-chemicals/2; OFFICE 
OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PROPOSITION 65 IN PLAIN LANGUAGE (2013) [hereinafter PROP 65 PLAIN 
LANGUAGE], http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/background/p65plain.html (last updated Feb. 2013); David Roe, 
Little Labs Lost: An Invisible Success Story, 15 GREEN BAG 275, 275 (2012). 
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margin of victory.13 Its passage ushered in a dramatically different and deceptively 
straightforward approach to addressing the perceived inadequacies of existing 
environmental laws.14 Simply put, Prop 65 proponents argued that existing laws 
were not “tough enough.”15 Indeed, section 1 of Prop 65 wags the proverbial finger 
at “state government agencies” for failing to adequately protect the people of 
California from hazardous chemicals.16 Despite vigorous opposition by industry, 
agriculture, and editorial boards of numerous newspapers, including the Los 
Angeles Times, this emotive message won out.17 
In approving Prop 65, voters declared their rights to protect themselves against 
chemicals that cause cancer or reproductive harm and to be informed about 
exposures to such chemicals.18 The specific provisions of Prop 65, including the 
 
 12. See MARCH FONG EU, SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 4, 1986 (U.C. Hastings Scholarship Repository) [hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHLET], 
http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/971/. To assist California voters in assessing the merits of 
Prop 65, among other propositions, the Secretary of State assembled and distributed a California Ballot 
Pamphlet, which “contains the ballot title, a short summary, the Legislative Analyst’s analysis, the pro and con 
arguments and rebuttals, and the complete text of each proposition.” Id. at 2. Each ballot measure is designated 
as a proposition and assigned a number. Id. at 3. More generally, Prop 65 is an example of a ballot statutory 
initiative, a common legislative vehicle in California, by which the electorate either creates or amends a statute. 
L.Tobe Liebert, Researching California Ballot Measures, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 27, 28–29 (1998). This initiative power is 
rooted in California’s Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. The arguments for and against a proposition in the 
ballot pamphlet constitute the “‘intent’ of the electorate.” Liebert, supra, at 36.  
 13. See Kenneth W. Kizer et al., Sound Science in the Implementation of Public Policy, 260 JAMA 951, 951 
(1988). 
 14. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 54. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 53. But in raising alarm bells, vocal opponents feared that mandating Prop 65 on “millions of 
ordinary and safe items” would serve no useful purpose. Id. at 54. See, e.g., Devin S. Schindler & Tracey Brame, 
This Medication May Kill You: Cognitive Overload and Forced Commercial Speech, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 27, 55–57 
(2013) (rejecting the government notion that cigarette labels are necessary because people who choose to smoke 
lack enough information to make a “truly rational decision,” especially since the addictive and harmful health 
effects of cigarettes are so widely disseminated; more information is not always better than less). Ironically, Prop 
65 detractors agreed with Prop 65 proponents in arguing that better enforcement of the current plethora of 
environmental laws was needed. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 55. 
 17. See No on Toxics Initiative, supra note 8; Kizer et al., supra note 13, at 951. The dire forewarnings 
predicted by the anti-Proposition 65 critics, however, failed to materialize—Prop 65 has neither led to the 
banning of ordinary table salt nor warning labels on every apple sold served in California. No on Toxics 
Initiative, supra note 8. 
 18. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 54. Other rights include the right to strict enforcement of laws 
controlling hazardous substances and the right to have offenders of illegal hazardous waste disposal bear more 
of the costs for cleanups than taxpayers. See id. “Proposition 65 represents the most ambitious attempt by any 
state to regulate hazardous chemical exposure through information disclosure rather than by direct mandate.” 
Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 303, 306 (1996). 
  As with other voter initiatives, however, it is difficult to say whether the electorate fully grasped and 
understood the contours of Prop 65 in casting their vote.  See Kizer, supra note 13, at 951. 
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controversial “right to know” warning requirements discussed throughout this 
article, purportedly advance those rights.19 
A. Overview of Prop 65’s Warning Mandate 
Prop 65’s warning mandate provision is a mere one sentence in length: “No person 
in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any 
individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity 
without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual, except as 
provided in Section 25249.10.”20 Warnings, however, “need not be provided 
separately to each exposed individual.”21 And numerous warning methods, such as 
the posting of notices, mailings, and labels, may be utilized if the warning provided is 
clear and reasonable.22 
 
 19. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, (“We each have a right to know, and to make our own choices 
about being exposed to these chemicals [that cause cancer or reproductive disorders]”); see also DiPirro v. 
Bondo Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (referring to Prop 65 as “informational and 
preventative rather than compensatory in its nature and function.”). The DiPirro court also noted that 
Proposition 65 “facilitate[s] the notification of the public of potentially harmful substances, so informed 
decisions may be made by consumers on the basis of disclosure.” Id. at 747–48. As argued, Prop 65 warnings 
communicate very little useful information and thus hamper informed decision-making. Prop 65 was not the 
only law to embrace right to know provisions. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), also passed in 1986, contains explicit right to know provisions. See What is EPCRA?, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/what-epcra (last updated Nov. 10, 2015); Carl Cranor, Information 
Generation and Use Under Proposition 65: Model Provisions for Other Postmarket Laws?, 83 IND. L.J. 609, 624 
(2008).  
 20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West 2006). Given the brevity of the warning provision, much 
was left to the state agency tasked with implementing Prop 65 and to the courts to sort out. The term 
“intentionally” is not defined in the statute or regulation. “Knowingly” is defined in the regulations as referring 
“only to knowledge of the fact that . . .[an] exposure to a chemical listed . . . is occurring.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
27, § 25102(n) (2016). “Person in the course of doing business” does not include any state or federal agency, 
public water system, or “any person employing fewer than 10 employees . . . .” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
25249.11(b) (West 2006). 
  Section 25249.10 delineates three exemptions from the warning requirement: when a warning for an 
exposure is preempted by federal law; for an exposure that occurs within 12 months of “the listing of the 
chemical in question;” and for “[a]n exposure for which the person responsible can show that the exposure 
poses no significant risk . . . .” Id. § 25249.10. See also OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, REVISED 
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS 32 (1988) [hereinafter RFSOR], 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/pdf_zip/12601FSORNov1988.pdf (“Unless a business has reason to know 
that the product contains a listed chemical, no testing is needed, and no warning is necessary.”). 
 21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11(f) (West 2006). Prop 65 has prompted some manufacturers to 
avoid Prop 65 warning requirements through product reformulation—replacing a Prop 65 listed chemical with 
a non-listed chemical. Rechtschaffen, supra note 18, at 307, 313, 318, 320 n.83, 341–45. But despite what the 
drafters may have intended in drafting Prop 65, the Ballot Pamphlet is devoid of any discussion of product 
reformulation as a justification. See generally BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12. 
 22. See PROP 65 PLAIN LANGUAGE, supra note 11. The term “clear” refers to the warning content—the 
message itself; the word “reasonable” refers to the method of warning—how a message is presented or 
transmitted. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 2.  
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To provide businesses with “reasonable certainty that they will not be subjected 
to an enforcement action over the warning[s] they provide,”23 the Health and 
Welfare Agency of California (the predecessor of OEHHA)24 promulgated both 
“safe harbor” warning methods and content  for exposures related to consumer 
products, occupational exposures, and environmental exposures.25 
Exemptions from the warning requirement include a showing that exposure to a 
listed carcinogen poses “no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level 
in question,”26 and for a listed reproductive toxicant, a showing that “the exposure 
will have no observable effect assuming exposure at one thousand (1,000) times the 
level in question.”27 To assist businesses in determining whether a warning is 
required, OEHHA promulgated  safe harbor  levels, known as no significant risk 
levels (“NSRLs”) for carcinogens and maximum allowable dose levels (“MADLs”) 
for reproductive toxicants.28 But OEHHA’s penchant for listing chemicals has far 
surpassed its ability to promulgate safe harbor levels,29 despite pronouncements to 
 
 23. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 8. “Normally, whether a warning is clear and reasonable will be a question of 
fact to be determined on a case by case basis.” Id. at 7. 
 24. The Health and Welfare Agency of California was the initial lead agency tasked with implementing 
Prop 65; the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) is the current lead agency. OFFICE 
OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, TITLE 22 CCR § 12000-14000, PROPOSITION 65 – CHANGES WITHOUT 
REGULATORY EFFECT – TITLE 22, REGULATORY UPDATE PROJECT (2008), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/regs032808.html. Unless otherwise indicated, “OEHHA” is used throughout 
this article to refer both to OEHHA and the Health and Welfare Agency of California. 
 25. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, §§ 25601–25605.2 (2016). For consumer products that contain a 
carcinogen, for example, the safe harbor provisions specify that the warning must include the following 
language: “WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer.” Id. 
§ 25603.2(a)(1). The warning may be provided on a product’s label or through other means specified in section 
25603.1: (a)–(d).  
 26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 2006). The burden of showing that a warning is not 
required falls on the individual responsible for the exposure in question. Id. For both listed carcinogens and 
reproductive toxicants, the level in question is the amount of the exposure to a listed chemical for which “the 
person in the course of doing business is responsible.” See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, §§ 25721(a), 25821(a) 
(2016). For listed carcinogens, “no significant risk” is defined as the risk level “calculated to result in one excess 
case of cancer in an exposed population of 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question . . . .” Id. 
§ 25703(b). 
 27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 2006). If the no observable effect level for a chemical 
is 1 milligram per day (mg/day), the level of the chemical in question to which an individual could be exposed 
without triggering the warning requirement would be 1 mg/day divided by 1000, or 0.001 mg/day. Id. 
 28. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, MOST CURRENT PROPOSITION 65 NO SIGNIFICANT RISK 
LEVELS (NSRLS) MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DOSE LEVELS (MADLS) (2013), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/getNSRLs.html. See also Roe, supra note 11, at 288 (footnote omitted) 
(“[D]efendants need a reliable way of showing what the exemption level is. The only sure way is to point to an 
official determination. Numbers fixed by the regulatory agency don’t create liability, in other words; they create 
shields against what would otherwise be wider liability.”). 
 29. Safe harbor levels assist businesses in determining whether a warning is required. If the level of 
exposure does not exceed the safe harbor level, then no warning is required. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
25249.6, 25249.10 (West 2006); see, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, arts. 7–8 (2016). In the late 1980s, OEHHA 
“provided specific no significant risk levels” and therefore anticipated “that warnings will be necessary in 
relatively few cases.” RFSOR, supra note 20, at 27. As of December 2015, of the over 800 chemicals “known to 
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“strive to develop . . . a draft safe harbor level within one year of the chemical’s 
listing.”30 
The Governor was tasked in a separate Prop 65 provision to create a list, updated 
at least annually, of chemicals that are known to cause cancer or reproductive 
toxicity.31 Various mechanisms for adding chemicals to the list are described in this 
provision.32 One mechanism involves a determination rendered by “the state’s 
qualified experts”33 who serve on OEHHA’s Science Advisory Board, which is 
composed of the Carcinogen Identification Committee (“CIC”) and the 
Developmental and Reproductive Toxicant Identification Committee 
(“DARTIC”).34 The warning requirements take effect within 12 months of listing 
through any of the several mechanisms.35 
B. Enforcement and Burden Shifting 
Any person violating or threatening to violate Prop 65’s warning requirements may 
be enjoined;36 violators also are subject to civil penalties not to exceed $2,500 per 
day for each violation.37 Enforcement of Prop 65’s warning requirements may be 
pursued by the California Attorney General, any district attorney, certain city 
attorneys, and city prosecutors.38 If none of these individuals “has commenced and 
is diligently prosecuting an action against the violation,” then a “private action” by 
“any person in the public interest” may be commenced only after 60 days from the 
date the person has given notice of the alleged violation to the alleged violator, the 
 
the State [of California] to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity,” approximately 30% have safe harbor levels, 
and most of these levels were published before 2002. Less than 20% of the safe harbor levels were published in 
the last 10 years. See OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE 
CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY (2015) [hereinafter CURRENT PROP 65 LIST DECEMBER 2015], 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/prop65_list/files/P65single120415.pdf. 
 30. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, NOTICE OF NEW PRACTICE REGARDING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITION 65 SAFE HARBOR LEVELS FOR NEWLY LISTED CHEMICALS (2008), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/policy_procedure/safeharbor020108.html. In September 2012, OEHHA updated its 
“Priority List for the Development of Proposition 65 Safe Harbor Levels” and assigned priority levels to 
numerous chemicals for which safe harbor levels had not been adopted. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD 
ASSESSMENT, PRIORITY LIST FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITION 65 SAFE HARBOR LEVELS NO SIGNIFICANT 
RISK LEVELS (NSRLS) FOR CARCINOGENS AND MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DOSE LEVELS (MADLS) FOR CHEMICALS 
CAUSING REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY (2012), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/state_listing/prioritization_notices/prior083012.html. OEHHA 
anticipated that within two years, safe harbor levels would be proposed for “many of the chemicals in the first 
priority group.” Id. As of December 2015, OEHHA has yet to propose, let alone finalize, safe harbor levels for 
the vast majority of first priority group chemicals. See CURRENT PROP 65 LIST DECEMBER 2015, supra note 29. 
 31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(a) (West 2006). 
 32. Id. § 25249.8. 
 33. Id. § 25249.8(b). 
 34. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25302 (2016). 
 35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(b). 
 36. Id. § 25249.7(a). 
 37. Id. § 25249.7(b) (West 2006). 
 38. Id. § 25249.7(c)–(d). 
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Attorney General and the prosecutor in whose jurisdiction the violation is alleged to 
have occurred.39 
The 60-day notice requirement “was intended to trigger agency enforcement, 
and to afford the [agency], state, and violator sixty days to resolve the problem 
without being harassed by a lawsuit.”40 “[A]ny person” has been euphemized to 
“bounty hunter,” and describes persons who have fueled the flames of 
consternation among businesses on the receiving end of bounty hunter suits.41 And 
the California code statutorily mandates a portion of the civil penalties collected in 
these actions be paid to the bounty hunter.42 “Moreover, [Prop 65] does not have a 
standing requirement; a plaintiff need not allege or prove damages to maintain an 
action . . . .”43 
As noted, Prop 65 exempts an exposure to a listed chemical from attendant 
warnings if the exposure can be shown to pose no significant risk or observable 
effect.44 Prop 65, unlike most environmental and health statutes,45 distinctively 
places the “onerous”46 burden of meeting this exemption squarely on the shoulders 
of the defendant, not on the party bringing a Prop 65 enforcement action.47 Thus, 
the warning exemption serves as “an affirmative defense within that action.”48 
II. PROPOSITION 65 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
 39. Id. § 25249.7(d)(1)–(2). 
 40. Yeroushalmi v. Miramar Sheraton, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 41. Bounty hunter law suits are “private actions” permitted by Prop 65, which has resulted in a wave of 
frivolous lawsuits by these bounty hunters, who often file suit in hopes of eliciting quick settlements.  
 42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12(d) (“Twenty-five percent of all civil and criminal penalties . . . 
shall be paid” to the bounty hunter bringing the suit). 
 43. DiPirro v. Bondo Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). See also Nat’l Paint & Coatings 
Ass’n v. State, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that California’s Constitution, unlike the 
U.S. Constitution, “contains no ‘case or controversy’ requirement”). 
 44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 2006); see supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text 
(explaining exemptions from the warning requirement where it is shown the “listed carcinogen poses ‘no 
significant risk’” or in the case of reproductive toxicants, “no observable effect”).  
 45. Kristen R. Stevens, Regulating Toxics at the State Level: Proposition 65’s Warning Requirement, 9 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 84, 123 (1990) (footnote omitted) (“In most environmental and health statutes, the burden falls on 
the agency to show that a released chemical is harmful. . . . Proposition 65’s no significant risk exception instead 
places the burden of proof on the business to show that the amount of the listed substance released is 
harmless . . . .”). 
 46. DiPirro, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 754. See also Consumer Def. Grp. v. Rental Hous. Indus. Members, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 832, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that “the burden shifting provisions make it virtually impossible 
for a private defendant to defend a warning action . . . short of actual trial”).  
 47. See Consumer Def. Grp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 853 (describing the burden shifting provision of section 
25249.10 as “[t]he critical part” of Prop 65). 
 48. DiPirro, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 749. “The standard of proof required of the defendant to establish the 
warning exemption is ‘the preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Id. at 751–52.  
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This section analyzes the framework under which First Amendment protection is 
afforded to commercial speech and then argues why  Prop 65 runs afoul of the First 
Amendment. This section concludes by describing the key Prop 65 drivers of 
private enforcement. 
 
 
 
A. History of Commercial Speech and First Amendment Scrutiny 
1. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 
Prop 65’s mandated warning disclosures for consumer product exposures impact 
vast stretches of the business community, from the manufacturer to the retailer and 
everyone in between. Arrayed against these mandated disclosures, however, are the 
commercial speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment that emerged 
in the landmark case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.,49 in which the United States Supreme Court confronted the question 
of “whether speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’”50 
is “wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.”51 
Under a Virginia statute, a pharmacist who advertised price information on 
prescription drugs was guilty of unprofessional conduct.52 The state argued that 
advertising prescription drug prices would set in motion a host of maladies, 
including driving some pharmacists out of business and diminishing the 
professional image of the pharmacist.53 The Court rejected the “highly paternalistic 
approach”54 embodied in the Virginia statute, embracing instead an approach in 
which “people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them.”55 Advertisements convey information 
that benefits the economic interests of the advertiser and the consumer’s interest in 
“who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”56 
 
 49. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 50. Id. at 762. 
 51. Id. at 761 (explaining that commercial speech encompasses advertisements of commercial transactions 
between the advertiser and the consumer); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience”). But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (“More subject to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the 
category of expression that may be termed commercial speech . . . .”). 
 52. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 752. 
 53. Id. at 766–68. 
 54. Id. at 770. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 765. 
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Commercial speech, as the Supreme Court held in Virginia Pharmacy, is 
protected speech, but to a lesser extent than noncommercial speech.57 “There are 
commonsense differences between speech that does ‘no more than propose a 
commercial transaction’ and other varieties.”58 Commercial speech embodies 
attributes of “greater objectivity and hardiness” and “durab[ility],” and is therefore 
more resilient to government regulation.59 
2. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York 
Drawing on the teachings of Virginia Pharmacy and its progeny,60 the Court in 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York61 fashioned 
a four-prong standard to determine whether the government’s regulation of 
commercial speech runs afoul of the First Amendment:62 1) if the commercial 
speech sought to be regulated is neither misleading nor pertaining to unlawful 
activity, the court asks,63 2) whether the interest asserted by the government is 
substantial,64 3) whether the regulation “directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted,”65 and 4) “is not more extensive than is necessary66 to serve that interest.”67 
 
 57. See J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define Commercial Speech—Why 
Wouldn’t the Supreme Court Finally “Just Do It™”?, 82 N.C.L. REV. 797, 801–02 (2004) (explaining that because 
the Constitution affords less protection to commercial speech than to noncommercial speech, governmental 
regulation of commercial speech is valid if it passes the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test). 
 58. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (citation omitted). 
 59. Id. at 772 n.24; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“To require a parity 
of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a 
leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather 
than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a 
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment 
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial 
expression.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453–54 (affirming that a ban on in-person solicitation of non-lawyers 
does not violate free speech guarantees under the First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
363–64 (1977) (holding that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important 
functions it serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about services and products). 
 61. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 62. Id. at 566. The Court underscored the vital role of commercial speech in serving not only “the 
economic interests of the speaker, but also assist[ing] consumers and further[ing] the societal interest in the 
fullest possible dissemination of information.” Id. at 561–62.  
 63. Id. at 566. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. A regulation will fail the third prong if “it provides only ineffective or remote support for the 
government’s purpose.” Id. at 564; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (ruling that Florida’s ban 
on CPA solicitation failed to advance the State’s asserted interests “in any direct and material way” because the 
restriction in question did not demonstrate “that the harms [the state] recite[d] [we]re real and that [the] 
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree”). 
 66. Despite the use of the word “necessary” in the fourth prong, “not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest” is not synonymous with the “least restrictive means.” See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476–77 (1989). The Court further elaborated that “[w]hat our decisions require is a 
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This standard represents an intermediate level of review,68 commensurate with the 
subordinate position afforded to commercial speech.69 
In Central Hudson, the Court applied its newly forged four-prong standard to 
the Public Service Commission’s ban on all advertising that promoted the use of 
electricity.70 Although the advertising at issue was neither inaccurate nor related to 
unlawful activity, and advanced the substantial governmental interest in energy 
conservation, the Court determined that the regulation did not satisfy the fourth 
prong.71 The Commission painted with too broad a brush in enacting a 
comprehensive ban, and failed to demonstrate that its substantial interest in energy 
conservation could not be adequately protected by a more limited measure.72 
3. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio 
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,73 the 
Court grappled not only with state prohibitions on commercial speech, to which it 
applied the Central Hudson standard, but also state-mandated disclosures.74 The 
court noted that First Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech is 
predicated “principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech 
provides.”75 Thus, mandatory disclosures “trench much more narrowly on an 
advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech”76 and do not violate an 
advertiser’s First Amendment rights if the disclosures are “reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”77 
 
‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends—a fit that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in 
proportion to the interest served’ . . . .” Id. at 480 (internal citation omitted). See also In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 
203 (1982) (requiring government restrictions to “be narrowly drawn” and not more extensive than reasonably 
necessary); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 (articulating the fourth prong as “whether the extent of the restriction on 
protected speech is in reasonable proportion to the interests served”). 
 67. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 68. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767. 
 69. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. See also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 
(1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny—a level “commensurate with the ‘“subordinate position”’ of 
commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values—in upholding the Florida Bar’s restrictions on mail 
solicitation of accident victims).  
 70. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 71. Id. at 569–71. 
 72. Id. at 571. 
 73. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 74. See id. at 629, 638. 
 75. Id. at 651. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. A lesser standard of review than the Central Hudson standard is commensurate with the minimal 
“constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in [] advertising.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). The Court also noted in a footnote that disclosure requirements do not need to “get at 
all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate” and can therefore attack a problem piecemeal. Id. at 652 
n.14.  
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Applying the “reasonably related” standard, which is less exacting than the 
intermediate standard of Central Hudson, the Court in Zauderer upheld the 
requirement that attorneys disclose to potential clients their liability for costs, even 
though contingent legal fees are not owed “if there is no recovery.”78 The State’s 
disclosure requirements passed constitutional muster because they were reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in not deceiving potential clients.79 The disclosure 
requirements also entailed “purely factual and uncontroversial information,”80 an 
“essential feature”81 in the Court’s analysis. 
The Supreme Court has never applied Zauderer to disclosure requirements not 
designed to correct misleading commercial speech.82 Some lower federal courts, 
however, have strayed from Zauderer in applying its “reasonably related” standard 
more widely.83 Thus, while Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that 
commercial speech is afforded less protection than noncommercial speech,84 the 
dividing line between these two categories of speech remains unclear.85 Nonetheless, 
 
  In a more recent case involving bankruptcy and debt relief, the Court applied Zauderer to uphold the 
government’s mandated disclosure requirement of accurate statements, which were “intended to combat the 
problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements . . . .”  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010).   
 78. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651–52. 
 79. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 653 (1985). 
 80. Id. at 651.  
 81. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. 
 82. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled 
by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Reynolds, “the government could not 
seek review under the lenient Zauderer standard absent a showing that the advertisement at issue would mislead 
consumers.” Id. at 1214. Disclosure requirements may also take the form of warnings “in order to dissipate the 
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. See also Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. 
 83. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting that 
Zauderer applies not only to mandates aimed at curing deception but to other purposes as well); CTIA-The 
Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, No. 15-cv-02529-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10332, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan 27, 
2016) (stating that “Zauderer was not limited to disclosures designed to prevent consumer deception, but 
extended to matters of public health and safety”). 
 84. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980). See also supra notes 57–
59 and accompanying text. 
 85. The boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech at times proves challenging to 
demarcate. Advertisements that propose a commercial transaction readily fall within the bounds of commercial 
speech as in Zauderer. This is the same for advertisements of prices. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the “speech” of advertising prices as “quintessentially 
commercial”). Other speech, however, resists the commercial speech label when “it is inextricably intertwined 
with otherwise fully protected speech.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). Yet, 
intertwined speech is not necessarily “inextricably intertwined.” In Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 474 (1989), “there [wa]s nothing what[so]ever ‘inextricable’ about the noncommercial aspects of 
[Tupperware parties].” Commercial speech “that links a product to a current public debate,” does not convert 
commercial speech into noncommercial speech, entitled to strict scrutiny. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557 n.5. 
Courts may skirt around resolving whether the speech at issue is commercial or noncommercial by assuming 
the former and applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. See Int’l Dairy Food Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 
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in subjecting Prop 65 warning provisions to First Amendment scrutiny, this article 
focuses on warnings for consumer product exposures and assumes they “relate[] 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” and therefore 
invoke commercial speech protections.86 
B. Warning Requirements Trigger First Amendment Scrutiny 
Prop 65 is simply a right to know voter initiative—not a means of preventing 
deception.87 “We each have a right to know, and to make our own choices about being 
exposed to these chemicals.”88 Armed with the knowledge that a product contains a 
listed chemical, Californians can then decide for themselves whether or not to 
purchase the product.89 Unlike the disclosures in Zauderer and Milavetz,90 Prop 65 
warnings also “do not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial 
information to consumers.”91 
Identifying a chemical as “known” to cause cancer or reproductive harm92 is 
predicated on a complicated process of scientific review and interpretation of 
available animal and human studies, as well as the application of assumptions,93 all 
 
(2d Cir. 1996) (“We need not resolve this controversy at this point; even assuming that the compelled disclosure 
is purely commercial speech, appellants have amply demonstrated that the First Amendment is sufficiently 
implicated to cause irreparable harm.”). 
 86. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. The Supreme Court in Central Hudson also noted that commercial 
speech “not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers.” Id. As argued in this 
article, Prop 65 warnings do neither. 
 87. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 52. 
 88. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 43. 
 89. See id. at 5, 33; BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 54. 
 90. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629, 650 
(1985) (requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee arrangements and 
purely factual and uncontroversial information about terms of service); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 229, 232–34, 250 (2010) (requiring debt relief agencies to identify themselves explicitly 
as debt relief agencies and disclose that assistance may involve bankruptcy relief). 
 91. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled 
by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 92. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006). 
 93. Perhaps the most glaring assumption is embedded within the exemption from Prop 65 warning 
requirements for reproductive toxicants: If the exposure “will have no observable effect, assuming exposure at 
one thousand times the level in question,” then no warning is required. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25803(a) 
(2016). This 1000× factor is applied in all situations whether or not scientific understanding of a particular 
chemical would support a lower factor (e.g., 100×, 10×). The Prop 65 Review Panel, which convened in the 
early 1990s, noted that “[t]he mandatory 1,000-fold safety factor for reproductive toxins is scientifically 
unjustified.” PROPOSITION 65 REVIEW PANEL, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF ISSUES (1992), 
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EPA_5year.pdf. 
  OEHHA’s regulations also set forth numerous assumptions to be applied in determining whether a 
chemical should be listed and in calculating NSRLs and MADLs. For example, “[t]he absence of a carcinogenic 
threshold dose shall be assumed and no-threshold models shall be utilized.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25703(5). 
Further, in calculating the level of exposure to chemicals causing cancer, “‘lifetime exposure’ means the 
reasonably anticipated rate of exposure for an individual to a given medium of exposure measured over a 
lifetime of seventy years.” Id. § 25721(b). Thus, even if consumers only sporadically purchase a consumer good 
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of which is fraught with scientific uncertainty, disagreement, and controversy. A 
chemical deemed safe by a federal agency, for example, may still be listed under 
Prop 65.94 Ultimately, a determination under Prop 65 that a chemical is “known” to 
cause cancer or reproductive harm is more akin to a scientific judgment,95 and not 
fact. Prop 65 consumer product warnings, therefore, are subject to Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny standard, not the lesser standard of Zauderer.96 
 
bearing a Prop 65 cancer warning, the NSRL for the carcinogen in the consumer good is based on the 
assumption that consumers are exposed to the carcinogen over a lifetime of 70 years. See also RFSOR, supra 
note 20, at 25 (“As a general rule, it is assumed that a chemical which produces an adverse effect by one route 
will produce adverse effects by other routes as well.”). 
 94. See Sciortino v. Pepsico, 108 F.Supp.3d 780, 786, 805-06 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that even though the 
FDA approved caramel for use as a color additive, the approval did not preempt Proposition 65 from deeming 
it unsafe). See also Consumer Cause v. SmileCare, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 632, 634 (2001) (stating that while 
federal agencies concluded that “dental amalgam is a safe and effective restorative material[,]” dental providers 
could still be found liable if they used the amalgam above the levels prohibited in Proposition 65). 
  In 2015, Dr. Luciana Borio, submitted a letter in response to OEHHA’s request for comments on its 
pending listing decision of BPA as a reproductive toxicant under Prop 65. The letter highlighted the findings of 
“an extensive, rigorous, and systematic four-year assessment of more than 300 scientific studies on BPA.” Letter 
from Dr. Luciana Borio, Acting Chief Scientist for FDA, to Monet Vela, 1 (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/hazard_ident/pdf_zip/BPA_FDA2015.pdf. Based on this assessment, FDA 
reaffirmed “that BPA is safe provided it [is] issued in accordance with our regulations.” Id. Regarding 
reproductive toxicity, the FDA pointed out relevant and important differences in humans and rodents – 
“People process BPA better than rodents; even in rodents, studies have shown that exposure to BPA cannot be 
measured in the unborn offspring of pregnant rodents exposed to 100 to 1000 times more BPA than people are 
reasonable expected to ingest.” Id.  
  After receiving public testimony, OEHHA’s Developmental and Reproductive Toxicant Identification 
Committee “determined that BPA was clearly shown . . . to cause reproductive toxicity.” OFF. OF ENVTL. 
HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, BISPHENOL A LISTED AS KNOWN TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO CAUSE 
REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY (2015), 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/list_changes/051115listBPA.html. OEHHA subsequently listed 
BPA as a Prop 65 reproductive toxicant. Id. 
 95. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE 
PROCESS 48 (Nat’l Acad. Press 1983) (“Risk assessment [of which hazard identification is a part]  is an analytic 
process that is firmly based on scientific considerations, but it also requires judgments to be made when the 
available information is incomplete. These judgments inevitably draw on both scientific and policy 
considerations.”). See also OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL GUIDANCE 
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING CHEMICALS FOR LISTING AS “KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE CANCER” (2001), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/policy_procedure/rev_criteria.html (citing OEHHA’s criteria for the Carcinogen 
Identification Committee, which notes that “[t]he application of causation criteria requires scientific 
judgment . . . .”). Similarly, OEHHA’s criteria for the Developmental and Reproductive Toxicant Identification 
Committee are “not intended . . . to limit its use of best scientific judgment.” OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CRITERIA FOR RECOMMENDING CHEMICALS FOR LISTING AS “KNOWN TO THE STATE TO 
CAUSE REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY” (1993), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/policy_procedure/pdf_zip/dartCriteriaNov1993.pdf. 
 96. But see Proposed Statement of Decision on Trial (Phase One) at 16, Council for Educ. and Research on 
Toxics v. Starbucks Corp., No. BC435759 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County June 25, 2015) (applying Zauderer and 
concluding that “[a] Proposition 65 warning requirement for the presence of acrylamide passes this ‘reasonably 
related’ test for several reasons”). One of the terse reasons for the court’s finding—the warning “that a chemical 
known to the state may cause cancer is not false or misleading”—is an inaccurate statement of the warning 
language. Id. (emphasis added). The verb “may” does not precede the verb “cause” in any Prop 65 consumer 
product warning. As discussed infra, Prop 65 safe harbor warnings misinform rather than inform.   
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Central Hudson’s first prong is met because Prop 65 regulates neither misleading 
nor unlawful activity.97 Satisfying the second prong hinges on whether the public’s 
right to know about potential exposures to certain chemicals in products represents 
a substantial interest.98 Prop 65’s right to know interests resemble those of Vermont 
in International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy,99 in which Vermont attempted 
to mandate the labeling of products from cows treated with growth hormone in 
response to “strong consumer interest and the public’s ‘right to know.’”100 
Concluding that Vermont “could not justify the statute on the basis of ‘real’ 
harms,”101 the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision not to grant the 
plaintiff’s preliminary injunctive relief.102 “[C]onsumer curiosity alone is not a 
strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual 
statement.”103 If that were not the case, the Court continued, “there is no end to the 
information that states could require manufacturers to disclose.”104 
Assuming arguendo that the right to know represents a substantial state interest, 
notwithstanding Amestoy, the State of California falters in meeting Central Hudson’s 
third prong by not providing “a shred of evidence––much less the ‘substantial 
evidence’ required by the [Administrative Procedure Act]”105 that mandated 
consumer product warnings directly advance the state’s asserted interest in a 
 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 98. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 99. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 100. Id. at 73.  
 101. Id. at 73. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., the D.C. Circuit assumed the “FDA’s 
interest in reducing smoking rates is substantial,” but in a footnote, the Court voiced skepticism “that the 
government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even 
one that has been conclusively linked to adverse health consequences.” 696 F.3d 1205, 1218, 1218 n.13 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court 
acknowledged, however, that “the Supreme Court has at least implied that the government could have a 
substantial interest in reducing smoking rates because smoking poses ‘perhaps the single most significant threat 
to public health in the United States.’” Id. at 1218 n.13. 
 102. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 103. See id. (applying the Central Hudson test). Yet, in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, the same Court 
applied the Zauderer “reasonably related” test to a Vermont statute “that requires manufacturers of some 
mercury-containing products to label their products and packaging to inform consumers that the products 
contain mercury . . . .” 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). Although both cases involved mandatory disclosures, 
the Second Circuit attempted, albeit unpersuasively, to reconcile the two cases by asserting that the decision in 
Amestoy “was expressly limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by . . . ‘consumer 
curiosity.’” Id. at 115 n.6. The Vermont statute in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, however, is related to the state’s 
interest in reducing mercury pollution. Id. at 116. The Court also feared that striking down the Vermont statute 
would expose a myriad of federal and state disclosure requirements, including those of Prop 65 “to searching 
scrutiny by unelected courts.” Id. 
 104. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74. 
 105. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Both the federal and California Administrative Procedure Acts require 
“substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11350(b)(1) (West 2006). 
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material way, or “that the harms . . . recite[d] are real and that . . . restriction [of 
commercial speech] will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”106 
The mandated consumer product warnings––“which must be used in order to 
provide a warning deemed clear without further proof”107––confuse rather than 
inform108 and “mislead[] consumers and distort[] their consumption decisions.”109 
The warnings lack the specificity necessary to ensure that the public receives useful 
information about potential exposures and encourage businesses to provide a 
warning even when none is required.110 They “focus more on the identification of 
potential hazards than on helping consumers develop an understanding of the 
magnitude and probability of a potential hazard than can be used for informed 
decision making.”111 For listed carcinogens, the safe harbor warnings fail to convey 
“that the risk levels involved might be as small as 1 chance in 100,000 [over a 
lifetime of exposure].”112 Instead, “the risks are portrayed as being entirely 
nonstochastic.”113 
Despite assurances that the original 1988 safe harbor warnings would enable 
informed choices,114 and “that no alternative considered would be more effective,”115 
OEHHA relented in a January 2015 regulatory proposal to revamp the warning 
 
 106. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993). Mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice. Id. at 770. 
Without Central Hudson’s third prong, California or any other state, “could with ease restrict commercial 
speech in the service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.” 
Id. at 771. 
 107. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 24. Safe harbor warning content and method of transmission “provide the 
businesses choosing to use them reasonable certainty that they will not be subjected to an enforcement action 
over the warning they provide.” Id. at 33. “It is not intended to be a warning straight-jacket.” Id. 
 108. Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
653, 667 (1993). 
 109. W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD, DRUG, 
COSM. L.J. 283, 289 (1988). 
 110. Rechtschaffen, supra note 18, at 356–57. 
 111. David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A 
Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1, 15 (1994). 
 112. Viscusi, supra note 109, at 291. 
 113. Id. 
 114. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 5. 
 115. Id. at 46.  
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requirements.116 “[T]he existing safe harbor warnings lack the specificity necessary 
to ensure that the public receives useful information about potential exposures.”117 
In November 2015, OEHHA issued a revised regulatory proposal to “further the 
‘right-to-know’ purposes” of Prop 65, based on voluminous public comments on 
the January 2015 proposal.118 Once again, OEHHA noted that current safe harbor 
warnings, rather than advancing the state’s purported right to know interests, 
“generate confusion and encourage businesses to provide a warning when none is 
 
 116. See OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CAL. CODE 
OF REGULATIONS, PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARTICLE 6 AND ADOPTION OF NEW ARTICLE 6, REGULATIONS FOR CLEAR 
AND REASONABLE WARNINGS JANUARY 16, 2015 (2015), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/Article6_ISOR.pdf.  OEHHA acknowledged that 
“[t]he public currently has no simple process for obtaining information about the chemical(s) that are present, 
whether or how they are actually being exposed to a significant amount of the chemical, how the chemical(s) 
may cause harm . . . or ways they can reduce or eliminate these exposures.” Id. at 3. 
 117. Id. at 1. In January 2015, OEHHA also proposed to create a website that would house supplemental 
information on Prop 65 listed chemicals not contained on the safe harbor warnings. The website would serve as 
a “one-stop shop for supplemental information concerning the warnings” such that individuals are able “to 
make informed decisions about . . . exposures.” OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INITIAL 
STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULTAIONS, PROPOSED ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 2, 
SECTION 25205, LEAD AGENCY WEBSITE JANUARY 16, 2015, at 2, 4 (2015), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/pdf_zip/ISOR_P65WebsiteJan2015.pdf. The website proposal 
generated a plethora of public comment, as did the proposed changes to the warning provisions. See OFFICE OF 
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF PUBLIC 
HEARING TITLE 27, CAL. CODE OF REG. PROPOSED ADOPTION OF SECTION 25205 PROPOSITION 65 LEAD AGENCY 
WEBSITE (2015), http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/NPR_P65WarningWeb.html. 
 118. See OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
PUBLIC HEARING TITLE 27, CAL. CODE OF REG. PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARTICLE 6 AND ADOPTION OF NEW ARTICLE 6 
– CLEAR AND REASONABLE WARNINGS (2015), 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/2NPRArticle112715.html. In support of the 
November 2015 proposal, OEHHA contracted with the U.C. Davis Extension Collaboration Center to conduct 
a survey of California residents “to assess the effectiveness [defined as helpfulness] of the existing and proposed 
warnings.” U.C. DAVIS EXTENSION COLLABORATION CTR., PROPOSITION 65 CLEAR AND REASONABLE WARNING 
REGULATIONS STUDY 1 (2015) [hereinafter PROP 65 WARNINGS SURVEY RESULTS], 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/112715ISORAppendixA.pdf. 
  When asked whether the “old” generic safe harbor warning or the “new” generic safe harbor warning 
was more helpful, over 75% of survey respondents chose the “new” warning. Id. at 1, 10. Participants were not 
asked to define the term “helpful” or identify those attributes of the “new” warning that they found more 
helpful. Unlike the “old” warning, the “new” warning included a warning symbol, the signal word 
“WARNING,” and the URL for a website to obtain more information. Id. app. C, at 80–117. But the “new” 
warning did not “clearly communicate the risk of exposure to chemical(s).” Id. at 4. The survey did include 
questions on proposed specific consumer product warnings, which offered suggestions on how to minimize 
exposures. E.g., for passenger vehicles, the warning urges individuals to “avoid breathing exhaust, service your 
vehicle in a well-ventilated area and wear gloves or wash your hands frequently when servicing your vehicle.” Id. 
at 85. OEHHA did not involve consumers in designing the proposed warnings, even though involving 
consumers would “likely . . . increase the probability that a given warning will have its intended effect.” Stewart 
& Martin, supra note 111, at 14. OEHHA also failed to “assess potential unintended consequences both within 
the target population and other individuals who may be exposed to the warning message.” Id. And in another 
survey question, less than 25% of respondents indicated that they were “very likely” to visit the website. PROP 65 
WARNINGS SURVEY RESULTS, supra, at 45. Whether they would visit the website before or after purchasing a 
product was not discerned. Id. at 71–72. Visiting the website after a product purchase would obviously disenable 
individuals from making informed decisions during product purchases. 
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required,119 precisely because they are so vague and meaningless.”120 And the 
“benefits” of even the proposed safe harbor warnings remain “intangible” and 
unquantifiable “in monetary terms.”121 This is not unexpected. After all, Prop 65 is 
grounded in providing information to individuals, not in prohibiting or preventing 
chemical exposures to curb health effects.122 
OEHHA insists that safe harbor warnings are not “a straight-jacket”123 and that 
“[b]usinesses may provide whatever warnings they choose” as long as they are clear 
and reasonable.124  But OEHHA  also acknowledged “reasonable men can differ on 
what is clear, and what is reasonable.”125 “Whether a warning is clear and reasonable 
will be a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”126  Only safe 
harbor warnings are “clear without further proof.”127 
Ironically, OEHHA discourages businesses from expounding on the content of 
the safe harbor warnings, fearing that additional verbiage on routes of exposure or 
degree of risk, for example, “could potentially confuse or mislead the intended 
recipients of the warning.”128 Businesses thus find themselves between Scylla and 
 
 119. Issuing warnings when none are required constitutes overwarning. See Chris Locke & Sandra A. 
Edwards, Proposition 65: The Law that Continues to Cry Wolf, LAW360.com (Mar. 9, 2015, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/628706/proposition-65-the-law-that-continues-to-cry-wolf. 
 120. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CAL. CODE OF 
REG., PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARTICLE 6 AND ADOPTION OF NEW ARTICLE 6 REGULATIONS FOR CLEAR AND 
REASONABLE WARNINGS NOVEMBER 27, 2015, 30 (2015) [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2015 ISOR], 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/112715WarningReg%20ISOR.pdf. 
 121. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT – 11/17/2015, at 15 
(2015), http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/112715ISORAppendixB.pdf 
[hereinafter Economic Impact Statement]. The costs of the proposal were quantifiable and estimated to range 
annually from $15 million to $30 million. Id. at 1. These cost estimates, however, did not include “defending 
lawsuits, paying attorney’s fees and penalties, determining the chemical exposures from products, and 
reformulating products to avoid the need to provide warnings.” Id. at 3.   
 122. HIGHLANDS CONSULTING GRP. LLC, OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PROPOSITION 65 
WARNINGS WEBSITE FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT 18 (2014), 
http://www.cio.ca.gov/Government/IT_Policy/IT_Projects/pdf/3980-003_3980-003_OEHHA_P65_FSR.pdf 
[hereinafter Prop 65 Warnings Website Feasibility Study Report]. See also Marlow, supra note 3, at 
1(concluding that “[l]ittle to no evidence is found indicating that Proposition 65 significantly influences cancer 
incidence in California”). According to Marlow, no comprehensive study has been conducted on whether Prop 
65 has improved public health. Id. at 22. 
 123. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 8, 33, 39. 
 124. Id. at 8. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25601 (2016). 
 125. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 7. 
 126. Id. at 39. 
 127. Id. at 24. “Since all warnings cannot be clear and reasonable, it is essential for the [safe harbor] 
regulations[s] to describe with some specificity the warning methods and messages.” Id. at 26. 
 128. Id. at 45. Advertisements with Prop 65 warnings therefore stand in stark contrast to the advertisements 
in Zauderer and Milavetz, in which the advertisers were not prevented from conveying additional information. 
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985). In its November 2015 proposal, 
OEHHA forbids any additional information in a warning that would “contradict” the warning message. 
NOVEMBER 2015 ISOR, supra note 120, at 12. OEHHA does not define the term “contradict” or provide any 
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Charybdis;129 convey meaningless safe harbor warnings that alarm rather than 
inform, or embellish them by providing more useful information but risk litigation. 
Most businesses opt for Scylla.130 Failing to pass the four-prong Central Hudson 
standard, Prop 65 safe harbor warnings for consumer product exposures run afoul 
of First Amendment commercial speech protection. 
 
 
C. “As Easy as Shooting the Side of a Barn”131 
The burden shifting provision of Prop 65, Section 25249.10(c) “make[s] the 
instigation of Proposition 65 litigation easy––. . . almost absurdly easy.”132 And “the 
burden shifting provisions make it virtually impossible for a private defendant to 
defend a warning action . . . short of actual trial.”133 Unsurprisingly, many 
businesses elect “the most prudent business decision” and settle with bounty 
hunters by paying “any demanded attorney fees and penalties . . . rather than 
contesting the case in court.”134 
But the pièce de résistance of litigation drivers  is another provision of Prop 65––
a portion of the civil penalties collected in bounty hunter actions is to be paid to the 
bounty hunters themselves.135 And these penalties are in addition to attorney fees.136 
Bounty hunters may also extract payment in lieu of penalties.137 Thus, for many, the 
 
examples of what might constitute contradictory language. Id. at 14–17. Prop 65 bounty hunter consent 
judgments may provide for additional warning information. Id. at 35–36, nn.38–40, 42. 
 129. Scylla and Charybdis, 10 NEW ENCYCLOPŒDIA BRITANNICA 576 (15th ed. 1993). In essence, caught 
between two equally unpleasant alternatives. 
 130. See RFSOR, supra note 20, at 7, 33; Rechtschaffen, supra note 18, at 325. 
 131. Consumer Def. Grp. v. Rental Hous. Indus. Members, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 132. Id. at 853. The court illustrated via an example of “just how simple it is for a hypothetical unemployed 
lawyer, eager to cash in on Proposition 65, to extract money from business using the [Prop 65] initiative.” Id. at 
854. 
 133. Id. at 853. 
 134. Anthony T. Caso, Bounty Hunters and the Public Interest—A Study of California Proposition 65, 13 J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 68, 69 (2012). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 3200–3204 (2016). “In many private-party cases the parties allocate all 
or nearly all of the penalty payment as a ‘payment in lieu of penalties’ – often to the group bringing the case – 
instead of treating it as a civil penalty.” Letter from Harrison M. Pollak, Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of 
Attorney Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, to Proposition 65 Private Plaintiffs and Counsel 1 (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/prop65/payment_letter.pdf.  
  Section 25249.12(c) specifies that the state is to receive 75% of all civil and criminal penalties, as a 
means of supporting Prop 65 implementation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12(c) (West 2006). 
“Payment in lieu of penalties” – not explicitly authorized by Prop 65 – therefore siphons off monies to private 
parties or organizations that would otherwise be allocated to the state. Caso, supra note 134, at 72–74. From 
2000 to 2010, Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation collected nearly $7 million in payments in lieu of 
penalties. Id. at 71. The Center for Environmental Health, another bounty hunter, faired comparably. Id.  
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“bonanza for private lawyers” foreseen by those arguing against Prop 65 in 1986 has 
come to fruition.138 
In 2001, the California legislature, “prompted by a concern that private enforcers 
were abusing Proposition 65 by filing meritless lawsuits,”139 amended the statute 
requiring bounty hunters to include, along with the 60-day notice, a certificate of 
merit (“CoM”). The CoM affirms that “the person executing the certificate believes 
there is a reasonable and meritorious case for private action” only after 
“consult[ing] with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience 
or expertise who has reviewed the facts . . . regarding the exposure to the listed 
chemical.”140 The CoM may have been engineered to “operate[] as a brake on 
improvident citizen enforcement.”141 In reality, however, filing a CoM may be as 
easy as a “phone call to your friendly professor.”142 The brakes may be applied by a 
court only after litigation has commenced and after the defendant has expended 
significant resources.143 
III. TIME FOR PROPOSITION 65 TO GIVE WAY TO A DIFFERENT 
APPROACH 
 
  On September 25, 2015, California’s Office of the Attorney General proposed amendments to the 
regulations that govern Prop 65 private enforcement actions. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 11, DIVISION 4, CHAPTER 1, at 1 (2015), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/prop65/prop-65-nopr.pdf. One of the objectives of the proposed 
rulemaking is “to ensure that the State in fact receives the civil penalty funds contemplated by the Proposition 
65 statute.” Id. at 3. 
  Instead of eliminating payments in lieu of penalties altogether, the Attorney General proposed only to 
cap the amount, despite acknowledging that the private bar is diverting “large amounts of what should be 
statutory penalty payments to Additional Settlement Payments.” OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, DIVISION 4-PROPOSITION 65 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, REVISION OF 
CHAPTERS 1 AND 3, TITLE 11, CAL. CODE OF REG. 1–2 (2015), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/prop65/prop-65-isor.pdf. “[A]ny agreement to forgo all or a portion 
of this penalty runs the risk of defeating the voters’ intention that penalty funds be used ‘to implement and 
administer’ Proposition 65.” Id. at 5. 
 138. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 55. “Proposition 65 creates a lawyer’s paradise: anyone can 
sue; almost anyone can be sued. People who sue will get a reward from penalties collected.” Id. 
 139. DiPirro v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7(d)(1) (West 2006). See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 3100–
3103 (2016). 
 141. Sciortino v. Pepsico, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 142. Consumer Def. Grp. v. Rental Hous. Indus. Members, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 143. See, e.g., Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication Granted, Pub. Interest All. LLC v. Access Bus. 
Grp., LLC, No. RG13697992 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County July 10, 2015) (dismissing the case against 
defendants because “Plaintiff’s COM was based upon . . . ‘probabilistic conjecture’” and “not supported by a 
credible factual basis”); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 
346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding the plaintiff’s “notice and certificate of merit were not supported by 
facts”). 
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The inherent flaws of Prop 65, discussed in Part II, linger, unfettered by legislative 
and regulatory reform efforts. If “[m]any Californians dismiss the warnings as silly 
and trivial,”144 then Prop 65 has failed to “enable Californians to make informed 
decisions about products they purchase.”145 After 30 years, it is time to ask whether 
the ubiquitous Prop 65 consumer warnings should remain a steadfast feature of 
California law, or whether they should be sunset to give way to a different 
approach.146 
Mandatory Prop 65 warnings are not the only means of dispensing information 
to consumers, nor are warnings necessarily “the optimal or even appropriate means 
for ensuring an informed consumer.”147 Manufacturers increasingly offer “green” 
products with ecolabels and environmental claims148 in response to consumers’ 
burgeoning demand for “green” products.149 Indeed, the shift toward “green” has 
been described as the “new normal” for the majority of American adult 
consumers.150 
 
 144. PROPOSITION 65 WARNINGS WEBSITE FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT, supra note 122, at 13. 
 145. ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT – 11/17/2015, supra note 121, at 14. 
 146. See Mark Snyder, Proposition 65 Can Spell Bankruptcy for Many California Small Businesses, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 16, 2014 4:00 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-
ed/soapbox/article3941246.html. Rather than focusing only on the warning requirements for consumer 
products exposures, a more comprehensive approach could entail eliminating: the mandatory 1000 fold factor 
in section 25249.10(c); bounty hunter provisions (or at least the ability to obtain bounty hunter penalties); 
payments in lieu of penalties; and the burden shifting provision. A revised Prop 65 also would not list any 
chemical that has been deemed safe by a federal agency. Warnings, (including those for consumer products 
exposures) would be used sparingly and only if warranted by the level of risk that constitutes a legitimate public 
health concern. But both approaches assume there is still a need for Prop 65-type legislation. Prop 65 emerged 
out of a climate of frustration that state agencies were not doing enough to enforce environmental laws and 
protect the citizenry from hazardous substances. It is unclear whether this climate persists or if Prop 65, as 
currently drafted, would overwhelmingly pass again. A voter initiative—a formidable endeavor—to proffer 
these or similar approaches may be the only remaining option, given the lack of legislative success in amending 
Prop 65. 
 147. Stewart & Martin, supra note 111, at 15. In the absence of mandatory Prop 65 warnings, product 
liability law still requires that manufacturers warn consumers about risks of injury from products (unless those 
risks are obvious). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 1 § 2 cmt. i. (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  
If mandatory state warnings of the Prop 65 ilk were the preferred modality, it is reasonable to expect that other 
jurisdictions would have adopted similar approaches. But in 30 years, “no comparable federal law or law in any 
other state . . . requires businesses to proactively warn individuals of exposures to substances appearing on a 
large chemical list.” PROP 65 WARNINGS WEBSITE FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT, supra note 122 at 16. 
 148. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued “Guides for the use of Environmental Marketing 
Claims” which “help marketers avoid making environmental marketing claims that are unfair or deceptive 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45.” 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (2012). See also UL, UNDERSTANDING THE 
EFFECTIVE USE OF GREEN PRODUCT LABELS (2013), http://library.ul.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/2015/02/UL_Final_Looking-Behind-Product-Environmental-Claims_v8-HR.pdf.  
 149. UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTIVE USE OF GREEN PRODUCT LABELS, supra note 148, at 8. The term “green” 
as used in Understanding the Effective Use of Green Product Labels, “includes all types of product marketing, 
ranging from a manufacturer’s own label to claims of third-party certifications and verifications.” Id. at 9 n.2. 
 150. Id. at 2. 
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Manufacturers, consequently, face increased pressure from retailers to use 
chemical assessment tools to analyze the chemical ingredients of their products.151 
The application of these tools “directly translate[s] into the availability of the 
products on shelves and, by extension, the ultimate viability of those products in 
the marketplace.”152 
Chemical assessment tools also play a role in fostering the development of 
voluntary ecolabels,153 which number in the hundreds.154 Ecolabels inform 
consumers’ purchasing decisions by distinguishing environmental attributes of a 
myriad of consumer products.155 Through the use of ecolabels, businesses seek to 
obtain “a market advantage for taking environmental factors into consideration 
throughout their supply chains. [Businesses] know their customers want this and 
they seek to provide it for them.”156 
Voluntary ingredient disclosures offer another approach to informing 
consumers.157 In 2010, for example, the American Cleaning Institute, Consumer 
Specialty Products Association, and the Canadian Consumer Specialty Products 
Association launched a disclosure initiative for intentionally added ingredients in 
air care products, automotive products, cleaning products, and polishes and floor 
maintenance products.158 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Design for 
the Environment program (“Safer Choice”) began requiring full ingredient 
disclosure as an element of its cleaning product certification in 2011.159 Over 2000 
products carry the Safer Choice label.160 Recently, Wal-Mart announced that it will 
 
 151. See Alison M Gauthier et al., Chemical Assessment State of the Science: Evaluation of 32 Decision-Support 
Tools Used to Screen and Prioritize Chemicals, 11 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 242, 242 (2015) 
(examining 32 chemical characterization tools out of 100 identified, and noting there is room for improvement 
if the ultimate goal is to accurately reflect potential chemical risk). Only a few of the tools characterized risk. Id. 
 152. Id. at 254. 
 153. See id. at 253; CORP. SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y SOLS., DUKE UNIV., 
AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, at 14 (2010), 
https://center.sustainability.duke.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ecolabelsreport.pdf. 
 154. AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, supra 
note 153, at 10. 
 155. Id. at 14. In contrast to “green” symbols or claims, an ecolabel is given to products that have met 
specific environmental criteria. Id. at 14. 
 156. Id. at 10. 
  157.   Ingredient disclosure alone does not convey health or safety information and thus does not enable 
informed risk based decision making.  Disclosing generic chemical names rather than chemical specific names 
can serve as a means of protecting trade secrets. 
 158. Ingredient Communication FAQs, AM. CLEANING INST., 
http://www.cleaninginstitute.org/policy/ingredient_communication_faqs.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 159. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S SAFER CHOICE STANDARD 7 (2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-12/documents/standard-for-safer-products.pdf. 
 160. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LEARN ABOUT THE SAFER CHOICE LABEL (2016), 
http://www.epa.gov/saferchoice/learn-about-safer-choice-label. 
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require online ingredient disclosure for household cleaning, personal care, and 
beauty and cosmetic products as of 2015.161 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There are undoubtedly other approaches that could serve to redress Prop 65’s 
warnings and its other infirmities. Until that occurs, Prop 65’s fundamental flaws 
remain unaltered, bounty hunters continue to thrive, benefits remain elusive, and 
the costs on businesses, consumers, and taxpayers continue to mount.162 
 
 161. Policy on Sustainable Chemistry in Consumables, WALMART, 
http://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/0b/84/abcc4b9d43449714cee2c15abbe2/policy-on-sustainable-chemistry-in-
consumables.pdf (last updated Feb. 21, 2014). 
 162. Marlow, supra note 3, at 28. 
